In Search of a Way In/Out

The Transatlantic Trade Relationship after the 2018 Mid-Term Elections

Bern, WTI, November 30, 2018



In Search of a Way In/Out

Part 1 The Transatlantic Trade Relationship

Part 2 Congress and the Presidency on Trade

Part 3 The Elections of 2016 and 2018

Part 4 Conclusion

Part 1: The Transatlantic Trade Relationship

Seen from the U.S.'s Perspective





European Union - Main Trading Partners

In %, 2016, Merchandise Trade

Source: WITS Database

Exp to






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United States - Main Trading Partners


In %, 2016, Merchandise Trade

Source: WITS Database



United States - Main Trading Partners in the EU


In % of overall U.S. trade, 2016, Merchandise Trade



Trade Deficits and Surpluses

'Buy American, Hire American, America First'


Donald Trump, at Grand Rapids, Mi, Dec. 9, 2016



Trade Deficits and Surpluses

'Buy American, Hire American, America First'

Donald Trump, at Grand Rapids, Mi, Dec. 9, 2016



Trump's Transactional Approach


'Buy American, Hire American, America First'


Donald Trump, at Grand Rapids, Mi, Dec. 9, 2016

"My Administration has launched a new era in American trade policy, driven by a determination to use the leverage available to us as the world's largest economy to open foreign markets and fairer treatment for American workers. One of the major pillars supporting my trade policy is the pursuit of better trade deals."

Trump Trade Promotion Extension Request, March 20, 2018








Trade Protection and Openness

	US 2016	EU 2016
Total number of tariff lines	10.516	9.414
Non-ad valorem tariffs (as % of all tariff lines)	10,9	10,7
Non-ad valorem with no AVEs (as % of all tariff lines)	0,0	3,0
Lines subject to tariff quotas (as % of all tariff lines)	1,9	4,7
Duty free tariff lines (as % of all tariff lines)	36,8	25,1
Average rate of the non-zero tariff lines (in %)	7,6	8,6
Simple average tariff (in %)	4,8	6,4
International peak tariffs (≥15%)(as % of all tariff lines)	5,1	8,8
Nuisance tariffs (0% <x≤2%)(as %="" all="" lines)<="" of="" tariff="" td=""><td>7,8</td><td>7,8</td></x≤2%)(as>	7,8	7,8

Source: WTO Trade Policy Review, United States 2016; European Union 2017


Tariff Distribution



Source: WTO Trade Policy Review, United States 2016; European Union 2017




U.S. imports from and exports to the EU, by large product category



Source: WITS Trade Database, data for 2015

U.S. trade balance with the EU, by large product category



Source: WITS Trade Database, data for 2015

The Hot Issues









The Hot Issues



The Hot Issues

Already today, the United States and the European Union have a \$1 trillion bilateral trade relationship – the largest economic relationship in the world. We want to further strengthen this trade relationship to the benefit of all American and European citizens.

This is why we agreed today, first of all, to work together toward zero tariffs, zero non-tariff barriers, and zero subsidies on non-auto industrial goods. We will also work to reduce barriers and increase trade in services, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, medical products, as well as soybeans.

This will open markets for farmers and workers, increase investment, and lead to greater prosperity in both the United States and the European Union. It will also make trade fairer and more reciprocal.

Secondly, we agreed today to strengthen our strategic cooperation with respect to energy. The European Union wants to import more liquefied natural gas (LNG) from the United States to diversify its energy supply.

Thirdly, we agreed today to launch a close dialogue on standards in order to ease trade, reduce bureaucratic obstacles, and slash costs.

Fourthly, we agreed today to join forces to protect American and European companies better from unfair global trade practices. We will therefore work closely together with like-minded partners to reform the WTO and to address unfair trading practices, including intellectual property theft, forced technology transfer, industrial subsidies, distortions created by state owned enterprises, and overcapacity.

Joint U.S.-EU Statement, Washington DC, July 25, 2018



The Hot Issues

"Two weeks go by. No negotiation. I say, 'Jean-Claude, you don't have to negotiate anymore, Jean-Claude. I am going to put a 25 percent tariff on Mercedes Benz, BMW, and every car you send in to the United States. We're putting a 25 percent tariff or tax on every car, millions and millions of cars, that you send in to the United States." He said, 'No, no, no, please! I will be there tomorrow morning.' This was an evening. I get to my office. He's there."


Inside U.S. Trade, Oct. 8, 2018




Part 2: Congress and the Presidency

Two U.S. Players on Trade






Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and Accountability Act of 2015



Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and Accountability Act of 2015


90 days notification about the intention to engage into a negotiation:

- The nature of the intended agreement
- The objectives that the agreement would meet
- The domestic laws that would be affected




Senate House of Representatives

Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and Accountability Act of 2015



Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and Accountability Act of 2015



Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and Accountability Act of 2015

Presidency


External Partner(s)

House of Representatives

• 45+15 days
• Filibuster-proof

Trade Agreement

• USITC Report
• Public availability of the text



$$U_{P}(p_{1}, p_{2,...,p_{n}}) = \sum_{i=1}^{n} \left(\beta_{i} p_{i} - p_{i}^{2} - \gamma \sum_{j \in N \setminus i} p_{j}^{2}\right)$$

$$i \in N = \{1,, n\}$$

= Internalization of all cross-district externalities

The executive takes into account the effect of protection in each district on all other districts. The individual legislator neglects these effects and focuses only on the impact on its own district.

Executive's utility, given protection levels in districts 1->n including district *i*

Based on: KONO, D.Y. (2009), "Market Structure, Electoral Institutions, and Trade Policy", in: International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 59, no 4, pp. 885-9

KU LEUVEN

$$U_i(p_1, p_2, \dots, p_n) = \beta_i p_i - p_i^2 - \gamma \sum_{j \in N \setminus i} p_j^2$$

Maximization of U_i through p_i, given β_i Given logrolling

$$U_i' \to \beta_i - 2p_i = 0$$
$$\to \beta_i = 2p_i$$

$$\rightarrow p_i = \frac{\beta_i}{2}$$

$$U_P\big(p_1,p_2,\ldots,p_n\big) = \sum_{i=1}^n \left(\beta_i p_i - p_i^2 - \gamma \sum_{j \in N \setminus i} p_j^2\right) \quad \text{Maximization of U_i through p_i, given β_i and γ} \cdot \frac{dU_i}{dp_i} = 0$$

$$U_P' \to \beta_i - 2p_i - 2[\gamma(n-1)]p_i = 0$$

$$\rightarrow \beta_i - 2p_i - 2p_i[\gamma(n-1)] = 0$$

$$\rightarrow \beta_i = 2p_i + 2p_i[\gamma(n-1)]$$

$$\rightarrow \beta_i = 2p_i[1 + \gamma(n-1)]$$

$$\Rightarrow p_i = \frac{\beta_i}{2[1 + \gamma(n-1)]}$$


Based on: KONO, D.Y. (2009), "Market Structure, Electoral Institutions, and Trade Policy", in: International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 59, no 4, pp. 885-9

Part 3: The Elections of 2016 and 2018

Two Struggles for Power



The 2018 Congressional Elections versus those of 2016



Sources:

2018: https://data.floridatoday.com/election-results/area/bibb-county-al/ (raw data)

2016: https://uselectionatlas.org/ (Leip's Election Atlas data)



114th Congress

Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and Accountability Act of 2015



116th Congress

218

 76
 68
 38


Progressives New Democrat Coalition Main St Partnership

Freedom Caucus

237/197

The 2018 Congressional Elections and Trade


What is the Direction of the Causality?



The Wall Street Journal, March 9, 2018



The Hot Issues



Trump and his Party



Source: The Wall Street Journal, March 8, 2018