

The Evolution of EU Trade Policy Towards China: The Case of Textiles and Clothing

(2010), in J. Men and G. Balducci (eds.), *Prospects and Challenges for EU-China Relations in the 21st Century*, Brussels: Peter Lang, Chapter 6, pp. 151-172.

by Jappe Eckhardt (World Trade Institute, University of Bern)

Link 1:

<http://www.peterlang.com/index.cfm?event=cmp.ccc.seitenstruktur.detailseiten&seitentyp=produkt&pk=57454&concordeid=21641>

Link 2:

http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1959957

Abstract

In this chapter I analyze, from a European viewpoint, the evolution of EU-China trade relations in general and EU's trade policy towards China more in particular. To this end I will answer the following question: in what ways has EU's trade policy towards China changed between 1978 and 2009 and what has spurred these changes? This question will be answered with detailed reference to important bilateral trade negotiations between Brussels and Beijing in the aforementioned period as well as to key trade policy decisions taken by the EU. All this will be done by using an in-depth case study of one of the most politically and economically sensitive sectors within EU-China trade relations: the textiles and clothing sector.

Interest groups and EU anti-dumping policy

(2011) in *Journal of European Public Policy*, Volume 18, Issue 3, pp. 339-360

by Dirk De Bièvre (University of Antwerp) and Jappe Eckhardt (World Trade Institute University of Bern)

Link 1:

<http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13501763.2011.551068>

Reprinted as "Interest groups and the failure of EU anti-dumping reform" in Andreas Dür and Manfred Elsig (eds.) "The European Union's Foreign Economic Policies: A Principal-Agent Perspective," London: Routledge, pp. 17-38.

Link 2:

<http://www.routledge.com/books/details/9780415667210/#description>

Abstract

Why did the European Union (EU) attempt yet fail to reform its anti-dumping legislation between 2006 and 2008? We analyse this attempt to reform a legislative act regulating interest groups' access to public decision-makers by relying on collective action and principal-agent theory. Contrary to approaches assuming that the European Commission enjoys a large degree of agent autonomy to implement a more liberal EU trade policy than most member state principals would want, we conceive of principals and their agents as actors responding to the relative balance between interest groups mobilizing for and against reform. Tracing interest group collective action advantages back to industry consolidation and the certainty of future losses, we argue that concentrated producer groups mobilize most intensively and persistently and successfully influence policy outcomes. On the losing side,

importers and retailers, joined by producers having outsourced parts of their production, let alone consumers, fail to counter this mobilization effort.

Firm lobbying and EU trade policy making: reflections on the anti-dumping case against Chinese and Vietnamese shoes (2005-2011)

(2011), in Journal World Trade, Volume 45, Issue 5, pp. 965-991

by Jappe Eckhardt (World Trade Institute University of Bern)

Link 1:

<http://www.kluwerlawonline.com/toc.php?area=Journals&mode=bypub&level=6&values=Journals%7E%7EJournal+of+World+Trade%7EVolume+45+%282011%29%7EIssue+5>

Link 2:

http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1959804

Abstract

It is an accepted view in the trade policy literature that those who lose from external trade are much more easily mobilized politically than those benefiting from it. As a consequence, the argument goes that there is an overrepresentation of protectionist interests in the political arena and a persistent pressure on policymakers to shield their markets from foreign competition. However, I argue that under certain circumstances, importdependent firms may very well be able and willing to mobilize politically and defend their anti-protectionist trade interests in the political arena. I will use the recent European Union (EU) anti-dumping case against Chinese and Vietnamese shoes to illustrate my argument.

The Politics of Global Sourcing: A Case Study of EU's Trade in Bicycles with China and Vietnam

(2012), Centre for ASEAN Studies Discussion Papers, No. 79

by Jappe Eckhardt (World Trade Institute University of Bern)

Link 1:

<http://www.ua.ac.be/main.aspx?c=.CAS&n=63677>

Link 2:

http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2005732

Abstract

During the last two decades, the number of manufacturers in the European Union (EU) that have outsourced (part of their) production to low-wage countries has increased enormously. At the same time there are also still plenty of firms that produce their products (almost) entirely in the EU. This paper studies the politics of global sourcing by investigating the political consequences of this division between, on the one hand, producers and EU Member States benefiting from increased imports from low wage countries and, on the other hand, firms and countries hurt by the inflow of cheap products made in China and elsewhere. It does so by using the EU bicycle sector and several recent EU anti-dumping proceedings against Chinese and Vietnamese bikes as a case study.