Venue-Shopping and Issue-Linkage in Global Migration Governance

The case of EU trade agreements

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## Line of argument

### Starting point:
1. «no international regime» & fragmentation of migration – related provisions (HR, labour, security, trade, development…)
2. Asymmetry of interdependence and power between sending, transit, receiving countries
   - Strong obstacles to international cooperation

### Thesis:
Trade agreement are a powerful venue to circumvent cooperation problems in shopping for migration clauses
- Allow for issue-linkages

### Question:
How far is the EU engaging in strategic venue-shopping through its trade agreements?
- Juxtaposition of rationalist & institutionalist hypotheses
- Analysis of 60 EU trade agreements concluded since 1963
Cooperation, issue-linkage & venue-shopping

Cooperation problem in migration
• Lack of overarching principles
• Asymmetry of interdependence & lack of reciprocity

→ From receiving country perspective cooperation needed for a) migration control and b) highly skilled workers
→ Strategies to overcome asymmetric cooperation dilemmas:
  • Coercion
  • Bargaining & issue-linkage
  • Socialization

→ Formal EU-trade agreements as potential venues for both coercion and issue-linkage!
→ BUT: is the EU such a strategic international actor?
Rationalist venue-shopping hypotheses

H1.1 The higher the probability of emigration from a third country to the EU, and the stronger its economic and political push factors, the more likely it is that trade agreements include security-related migration clauses.

H1.2. The closer a country is to the EU, the more likely it is that trade agreements include apart from security-related clauses also rights-related ones (i.e. asylum, worker rights).

H1.3. Visa facilitations are only granted in conjunction with readmission agreements.

H1.4. The more trade the EU has with a third country, the more likely it is that a trade agreement includes mobility clauses (services).
Institutionalist projection hypotheses

*H 2.1.* The inclusion of migration-related clauses varies across time and not across countries. It reflects changes in the organization of migration policies within the EU and does not discriminate across countries.

*H 2.2.* The closest the type of association with a third country, the more migration-related clauses it includes (irrespective of their type).

Null-Hypothesis

*H 3* The inclusion of migration related clauses in EU trade agreements follows neither a rational/strategic nor an institutional logic.
**Research Design**

**Dependent variable**
- migration clauses:
  - security-related clauses (irregular migration and readmission)
  - rights (social rights for migrants, human rights/ asylum)
  - movement-related provisions (e.g. visa, supply of services, establishment)

**Independent variables**
- economic factors:
  - GDP per capita ratio
  - trade balance
  - EU share of imports and exports

- political factors:
  - political rights and civil liberties index (FH)
  - stability/ conflict (dummy)

- immigration flows (dummy)
- geographical proximity (categorical)
- type of trade agreement (categorical)
## Preliminary Results

### Table 1 Logistic regression results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>DV (Security)</th>
<th>DV (Rights)</th>
<th>DV (Services)</th>
<th>DV (total migration provision)</th>
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Conclusions

- Support for both strategic venue-shopping and institutionalist projection
  → Need to look closer at relationship between the two

- Next steps:
  - Complete data-set
  - Fine-grade some of the indicators
  - Dig into data & combine with qualitative case studies

- For overarching project
  - Compare EU with US case → no issue-linkage in US trade agreements?
  - Analyse interplay between venues (esp. Multilateral vs bilateral vs regional vs transgovernmental)
  - Look at interplay between formal and informal venues, role of networks / partnerships / socialization-mechanisms