

# **Venue-Shopping and Issue-Linkage in Global Migration Governance**

## **The case of EU trade agreements**

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# Line of argument

## Starting point:

1. «no international regime» & fragmentation of migration – related provisions (HR, labour, security, trade, development...)
  2. Asymmetry of interdependence and power between sending, transit, receiving countries
- Strong obstacles to international cooperation

## Thesis:

Trade agreement are a powerful venue to circumvent cooperation problems in shopping for migration clauses

→ Allow for issue-linkages

## Question:

How far is the EU engaging in strategic venue-shopping through its trade agreements?

- Juxtaposition of rationalist & institutionalist hypotheses
- Analysis of 60 EU trade agreements concluded since 1963

# Cooperation, issue-linkage & venue-shopping

## Cooperation problem in migration

- Lack of overarching principles
- Asymmetry of interdependence & lack of reciprocity

→ From receiving country perspective cooperation needed for a) migration control and b) highly skilled workers

→ Strategies to overcome asymmetric cooperation dilemmas:

- Coercion
- Bargaining & issue-linkage
- Socialization

→ Formal EU-trade agreements as potential venues for both coercion and issue-linkage!

→ BUT: is the EU such a strategic international actor?

# Rationalist venue-shopping hypotheses

- H1.1* The higher the probability of emigration from a third country to the EU, and the stronger its economic and political push factors, the more likely it is that trade agreements include security-related migration clauses.
- H1.2.* The closer a country is to the EU, the more likely it is that trade agreements include apart from security-related clauses also rights-related ones (i.e. asylum, worker rights).
- H.1.3.* Visa facilitations are only granted in conjunction with readmission agreements.
- H.1.4.* The more trade the EU has with a third country, the more likely it is that a trade agreement includes mobility clauses (services).

# Institutionalist projection hypotheses

*H 2.1.* The inclusion of migration-related clauses varies across time and not across countries. It reflects changes in the organization of migration policies within the EU and does not discriminate across countries.

*H 2.2.* The closer the type of association with a third country, the more migration-related clauses it includes (irrespective of their type).

Null-Hypothesis

*H 3* The inclusion of migration related clauses in EU trade agreements follows neither a rational/strategic nor an institutional logic.

# Research Design

## *Dependent variable*

### – *migration clauses:*

- security-related clauses (irregular migration and readmission)
- rights (social rights for migrants, human rights/ asylum)
- movement-related provisions (e.g. visa, supply of services, establishment)

## *Independent variables*

### – *economic factors:*

- GDP per capita ratio
- trade balance
- EU share of imports and exports

### – *political factors:*

- political rights and civil liberties index (FH)
- stability/ conflict (dummy)

### – *immigration flows (dummy)*

### – *geographical proximity (categorical)*

### – *type of trade agreement (categorical)*

# Preliminary Results

Table 1 Logistic regression results

	DV (Security)				DV (Rights)	DV (Services)	DV (total migration provision)
Model	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Immigration	1.027***	(-.408)	(.267)	(.076)	(.760)		
Conflict	(.955)	(.726)	(.533)	(-.233)	(.911)		
Geography	(.055)	-.630***	-.596***	-.797***	-.640***		(.458)
Democracy FH_1		(.147)	.665***				
GDP p.c._1		-1.886***		-1.992***			
Year			.138***	.114***	.110***		(.018)
EU share of imports_1						-49.193***	
EU share of exports_1						-54.238***	
Type of agreement							-.451***
No. of observations	59	59	59	59	59	31	59

# Conclusions

- Support for both strategic venue-shopping and institutionalist projection  
→ Need to look closer at relationship between the two
- Next steps:
  - Complete data-set
  - Fine-grade some of the indicators
  - Dig into data & combine with qualitative case studies
- For overarching project
  - Compare EU with US case → no issue-linkage in US trade agreements?
  - Analyse interplay between venues (esp. Multilateral vs bilateral vs regional vs transgovernmental)
  - look at interplay between formal and informal venues, role of networks / partnerships / socialization-mechanisms